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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the creation of Salt Lake City Justice Court on July 1, 2002, divested the 
Third District Court of its original jurisdiction over class B misdemeanor criminal offense 
alleged to have occurred and otherwise properly charged in District Court prior to the 
establishment of the Justice Court on that same date. 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 14, 2002, Appellant Salt Lake City filed an information in the Third 
District Court charging the defendant with issuing a bad check, theft by deception, and 
possession of a controlled substance, each of which was alleged to have occurred on May 
30, 2001 within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City. Each of the three charges brought 
against the defendant was a class B misdemeanor. 
On July 1, 2002, Salt Lake City Justice Court was created per constitutional and 
legislative prerogatives. After the creation of the Salt Lake City Justice Court, the City 
did not file a second information against the defendant in the Justice Court concerning the 
same criminal conduct that was previously charged in the February 14, 2002, information 
filed in the District Court. While the City continued its original prosecution of the 
defendant in District Court, the two-year statutory period for filing an information 
charging the same criminal conduct in Salt Lake City Justice Court lapsed. 
On August 29, 2008, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the present matter for 
lack of jurisdiction, alleging that the creation of the Salt Lake City Justice Court divested 
Utah Third District Court of jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors alleged to have 
occurred within Salt Lake City limits. 
The Honorable Deno Himonas heard oral arguments on this motion from the City 
and the defendant on October 22, 2008, and entered a final order of dismissal of charges 
against the defendant on the same day finding that the Third District Court lacked 
jurisdiction. The City now appeals Judge Himonas' final order of dismissal. 
1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court should not have found that it lacked jurisdiction. The matter was 
commenced with a proper filing of an information, which vested original subject matter 
jurisdiction in the District Court. The Salt Lake City Justice Court did not come into 
existence until five months after the information was filed. Nothing in the statute creating 
the Salt Lake City Justice Court divested the District Court of its jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
Because this is a question of law, this court should review the trial court's 
conclusions for correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court's decision. 
See State v. Norris, 2007 UT 6, f 10,152 P.3d 293. 
I.THE ORIGINAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION THAT VESTED WITH 
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT WITH THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION 
ON FEBRUARY 14, 2002 CANNOT BE WAIVED. 
A court must have jurisdiction to legally have the authority to adjudicate a 
controversy. Utah's Constitution establishes district courts as the trial courts of general 
jurisdiction "hav[ing] original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this 
constitution or by statute." UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 5. Jurisdiction over a particular 
subject matter is derived from the law, James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998), and must be invoked in the manner as designated by applicable statute and 
procedural requirements. State v. Telford, 72 P.2d 626 (Utah 1937). Once invoked, 
jurisdiction vests and cannot be waived. James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d at 570. 
A. The matter was properly commenced, and jurisdiction vested, with the 
filing of an Information in the Third District Court. 
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Utah law is clear that jurisdiction must be invoked according to a certain 
procedure. Hakki v. Faux, 396 P.2d 867 (Utah 1964). This is accomplished by the filing 
of an information or indictment. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 4 and 5 (2001), UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 77-1-3 (2001) (defining "information"), UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2-1.1 (2001) 
(requirements for signing and filing of the information), UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2-2(3) 
(2001) (definition of "'Commencement of prosecution' means the filing of an 
information or an indictment). Filing is accomplished in the court that has original 
jurisdiction as determined by statute. 
In Hakki, the main issue before the Court was whether the district court had proper 
jurisdiction over the misdemeanor matter when the prosecution had commenced with the 
filing of a complaint in contravention to statute that required an information or 
indictment. 396 P.2d at 868. The Court found that the statutes and case authority clearly 
established the proper procedure. Id. citing State v. Telford, 72 P.2d at 627; see also State 
v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1040 (Utah 1941) (finding that "[s]ince the Legislature has 
laid down a certain procedure for invoking the jurisdiction of the district courts this 
procedure must be followed). Because this procedure was not followed, the trial court 
was prohibited from continuing with the scheduled trial. Hakki, 396 P.2d at 869. Although 
the judicial scheme in 2001 and at present does not utilize justices of the peace as 
understood by the Hakki and previous appellate courts, similar procedural requirements 
to prosecution and thus subject matter jurisdiction of the district court do apply. When the 
information was filed against Mr. Weiner on February 14, 2002 in the Third District 
Court, jurisdiction vested in the Third District Court as the court of original jurisdiction 
over the matter. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4(8) (2001). 
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B. Once jurisdiction vested with the Third District Court, the trial court 
should not have found that jurisdiction could be waived. 
Once a court's jurisdiction has been invoked, there is a strong presumption against 
divesting that court of its jurisdiction. See Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 2004 UT 15, 
89 P.3d 113. In Labelle v. McKay Dee Hospital Center, the Court was asked to determine 
whether plaintiffs failure to mail a copy of the request for a prelitigation hearing as 
required by the Medical Malpractice Act affected the district court's subject matter 
jurisdiction. 2004 UT 15, Tf 6. Despite plaintiffs failure to comply with this provision, the 
Court found that the district court's subject matter jurisdiction was not affected because 
the mailing requirement is a "minor component of the Malpractice Act's prelitigation 
scheme" and failure to comply may warrant a sanction but does not act divest the district 
court of jurisdiction. Id. at |^ 17. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized and relied on well established 
policies against divestiture of jurisdiction as it looked at the plain language of the 
Medical Malpractice Act under which jurisdiction was established. Id. at \ 8 n.2 (noting 
that "Other states have articulated a similar principle." See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 788 
P.2d 1178, 1181 (Ariz. 1990) (stating that "a presumption exists in favor of [a district 
court's] retention of jurisdiction, and divestiture . . . cannot be inferred but must be 
clearly and unambiguously found"); State v. Villados, 520 P.2d 427, 430 (Haw. 1974) 
(holding that "the law in favor of [divestment of a court's jurisdiction] must be clear and 
unambiguous"); Paly v. Coca Cola Co., 209 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Mich. 1973) (quoting 19th 
century Michigan State Supreme Court case that "the law in favor of [divesting a court of 
jurisdiction] must be clear and unambiguous . . . and leave nothing for the play of doubt 
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and uncertainty) (internal citations omitted)). This Court should recognize similar 
policies against divestiture of jurisdiction in the present case. 
Additionally, and contrary to the trial court's conclusion in the present matter, 
jurisdiction "can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused." James v. 
Galetka, 965 P.2d at 570. In that case this Court was asked to determine whether a statute 
of limitations bar may be waived with a guilty plea. In coming to the conclusion that 
statutes of limitations are not jurisdictional and may therefore be waived, this Court 
recognized a distinction between jurisdictional issues that could not be waived and 
nonjurisdictional issues that may be waived. Id. at 570. Subject matter jurisdiction may 
not be waived because it is a purely jurisdictional issue. Id. However, issues such as an 
accused's "right to a jury trial, right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against 
self-incrimination" and statutes of limitations are all nonjurisdictional issues that may be 
waived. Id. This distinction was not made at the trial court level when a defendant's 
variety of Sixth Amendment rights were considered to be analogous to the issue of 
jurisdiction. Transcript of Record, Utah Third District Court, Oct. 22, 2008, at page 6:10-
7:4, Salt Lake City v. Weiner (021902227). However, the law as argued by the City at the 
motion hearing below that under a plain reading of text of the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, which text only refers to jurisdiction as "which district shall 
have previously been ascertained by law", the general rule is that once jurisdiction has 
vested, no subsequent fact would defeat it, which comports with the ruling in James v. 
Galetka. Objection to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Salt Lake City v. Weiner 
(021902227), Court of Appeals File at 29. 
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In addition to improperly including jurisdiction under Sixth Amendment rights 
that a defendant may waive, the trial court may also have mixed the legal issues of 
jurisdiction and an accused's privilege regarding venue. Utah law provides clear guidance 
as to what a trial court should consider in granting or denying a request for change of 
venue. See State v. James, 161 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989); Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, 175 
P.3d 530; State v. Stubbs, 2005 UT 65, 123 P.3d 407 (overruling State v. Stubbs, 2004 
UT App 3); State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 28 P.3d 1278. However, because venue is not 
applicable to the present appeal nor to the decision of the trial court below, this Court 
need not consider Utah's law regarding change of venue. 
Because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the defendant, the only other way that 
divestiture of jurisdiction in the present matter would be accomplished is through clear 
and unambiguous language of the statute establishing the jurisdiction of the justice court 
to include such pending matters in the district court. See People v. Veling, 504 N. W.2d 
456 n.13 (Mich. 1993) (citing Leo v. Atlas Indus., Inc. ,121 NW2d 926 (Mich. 1963)). 
II.AS A MATTER OF LAW THE DISTRICT COURT WAS THE ONLY 
JUDICIAL FORUM THAT HAD COMPETENT SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE AT THE TIME THAT IT WAS FILED, 
AND THERE IS NO BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THAT SUCH JURISDICTION 
WAS DIVESTED BY THE CREATION OF THE SALT LAKE CITY JUSTICE 
COURT AT A LATER DATE. 
Appellant's prosecution of the defendant in present the matter was initiated on 
February 14, 2002, with the Appellant's filing of a formal information in Utah Third 
District Court charging the defendant with issuing a bad check, theft by deception, and 
possession of a controlled substance, Class B Misdemeanor criminal offenses alleged to 
have occurred on May 30,2001 within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City, Utah. At 
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the time the information was filed in the present matter, the district court had "original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and 
not prohibited by law." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4(1) (2001). This broad jurisdiction was 
limited, however, under the statutory scheme of the Judicial Code, which, at the time of 
filing, provided that Utah's District Courts have subject matter jurisdiction in class B 
misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances only if: 
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction; 
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996; 
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which the 
district courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed a justice 
court; or 
(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single criminal 
episode alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4(8) (2001). 
On July 1, 2002, the Salt Lake City Justice Court was created under the 
constitutional prerogative of Article VIII, §1 of the Utah Constitution and established by 
the statutory framework of the then-existing section 78-5-104 of the Utah Code. At the 
time of its creation, Salt Lake City Justice Court had "jurisdiction over class B and C 
misdemeanors, violation of ordinances, and infractions committed within [its] territorial 
jurisdiction by a person 18 years of age or older." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-104(1) 
(2001). After the establishment of the Salt Lake City Justice Court, the Appellant did not 
file a second information in the Justice Court against the defendant in this matter 
concerning the same criminal conduct that was previously charged in the February 14, 
2002, information filed in the District Court. 
Examining the plain meaning of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4 (2001), it seems clear 
that the District Court had jurisdiction over this matter when it was filed in 2002. The 
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Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed and articulated long-standing principles of 
statutory construction when it explained that, 
Under our rules of statutory construction, we look first to the statute's plain 
language to determine its meaning. We read [t]he plain language of a statute . . . as 
a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same 
statute and with other statutes under the same and related chapters. We do so 
because a statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated 
by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be 
construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a 
harmonious whole. 
State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15,1(10 (quoting Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, If 7, 162 P.3d 1099). 
In this case, there appears to be little or no question1 concerning the meaning of § 
78-3-4: Utah's District Courts maintain original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. This 
jurisdiction does not extend, however, to class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, 
infractions, and violations of ordinances unless specified conditions are met under the 
terms of § 78-3-4(8). Because no Justice Court existed within the territorial jurisdiction of 
Salt Lake City on February 14, 2002, it is apparent that at the time that this case was 
filed, there existed a condition recognized under the plain language of § 78-3-4(8)(a) 
giving the District Court jurisdiction over the class B misdemeanors charged in this case. 
Moreover, because Salt Lake City had not established a justice court pursuant to the 
framework of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-104 (2001) - a chapter of the Code which 
outlines the jurisdiction of municipal justice courts and is intimately intertwined with and 
related to § 78-3-4, the chapter of the Code which outlines the jurisdiction of District 
1
 Indeed, in the course of making its decision below, the District Court noted that it was a fact stipulated between the 
parties that the District Court had jurisdiction over the present case at the time of its initial filing. See Transcript of 
Record, Utah Third District Court, Oct. 28, 2009, at page 7:8, Salt Lake City v. Weiner (021902227). 
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Courts - there existed no competent tribunal within the territorial jurisdiction of Salt 
Lake City which had subject matter jurisdiction under the Utah Code to adjudicate the 
class B misdemeanors charged in the present case other than the District Court. 
However, in the course of making its decision below, the District Court 
determined that the dispositive issue was not whether it had jurisdiction over the present 
matter in the first instance, but rather whether its jurisdiction applied to the case 
"retroactively." The Court held that, "In fact, jurisdictional changes are viewed as taking 
away no substantive right, but simply changing the tribunal that's to hear the case and are 
largely construed as procedural. As a consequence, the presumption against retroactivity 
does not apply and [the statute giving subject matter jurisdiction over class B 
misdemeanors to the Justice Court] does apply retroactively." Transcript of Record, Utah 
Third District Court, Oct. 22, 2008, at page 7:11-16, Salt Lake City v. Weiner 
(021902227). Based on its determination that the jurisdictional statute giving the Justice 
Courts subject matter jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors applied to this matter 
retroactively, the Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the present 
matter and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the case. 
The District Court's analysis on this particular point is puzzling because the 
District Court's reliance on the notion of the "retroactivity" of the statutory framework 
seems misplaced. The appellant does not question the applicability of the statutory 
framework giving Justice Courts subject matter jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors to 
the facts of this case. Indeed, under the plain terms of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-104 
(2001), where applicable, Justice Courts clearly had jurisdiction over class B 
misdemeanors under the scheme Utah's Judicial Code at the time that this matter was 
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initially filed in District Court in February 2002. Accordingly, the terms of § 78-5-104 do 
not apply retroactively to the facts of this case because they already applied 
concomitantly to the facts of this case at its inception. For all legal purposes, nothing in 
the statutory framework governing the subject matter jurisdiction of our State's various 
courts over class B misdemeanors substantively changed between February 14, 2002, 
when this case was initially filed and October 22, 2008, when the District Court issued its 
decision dismissing this case. 
This matter was initially filed in District Court because, as was explained above, 
on February 14, 2002, there existed a condition recognized under the plain language of § 
78-3-4(8)(a) giving the District Court jurisdiction over the class B misdemeanors charged 
in this case: namely that no justice court created pursuant to the Utah Constitution and § 
78-5-104 (2001) existed within the territorial jurisdiction of Salt Lake City. As no other 
competent tribunal had both territorial and subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
class B misdemeanors charged by the appellant in February 2002, under the Utah Judicial 
Code, the District Court was the only proper forum in which the present matter could or 
should have been filed by the appellant. 
Understood in these terms, the District Court's focus on the concept of 
"retroactivity" would appear to have no bearing on the disposition of jurisdictional issues 
related to the appellant's prosecution of this case. Notably, the District Court's decision 
offers no explanation as to why an obvious condition precedent giving the Court subject 
matter jurisdiction over this case at the time of its filing ceases to be applicable merely 
because such a condition precedent would not have existed had the case been filed at a 
later date. No basis in law or fact has been stated for the proposition that the creation of 
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the Salt Lake City Justice Court in July 2002 rendered the jurisdiction of the District 
Court over cases filed pursuant to § 78-3-4(8) void. First, the plain language of the 
Judicial Code does not appear to support such a conclusion. In addition to the previously 
discussed provisions of § 78-3-4(8)(a), § 78-3-4(8)(c) provided that District Courts have 
jurisdiction over Class B misdemeanors when "the offense occurred within the 
boundaries of the municipality in which the district courthouse is located and that 
municipality has not formed a justice court." This language plainly indicates that District 
Court subject matter jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors exists where a case is filed 
in a municipality that has not formed a justice court. 
The language of the applicable statutes governing the subject matter jurisdiction of 
District and Justice Courts gives no indication - either as the statutes were written in 
2002 or as they are written today - of the Legislature's specific intent to dispose of cases 
properly filed in District Court prior to the creation of a justice court in a given 
municipality. No language in any Utah statute can be read or construed to strip or 
otherwise divest Utah's District Courts of their jurisdiction to adjudicate class B 
misdemeanors properly filed pursuant to § 78-3-4(8)(a) and/or § 78-3-4(8)(c) simply 
because a municipality subsequently creates a Justice Court with the subject jurisdiction 
to adjudicate such matters as may be filed by a prosecuting entity in the future. No 
statutory language exists indicating that such matters should be dismissed by a District 
Court and refiled in an appropriate Justice Court, and no language exists providing for the 
transfer of such cases from District Court to newly formed Justice Courts. Similarly, no 
decisional law indicates that District Courts lose their jurisdiction to hear such cases. 
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The legislative history of the former UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4(8) is instructive to 
the analysis here. Prior to 1998, the Legislature provided for a specific limitation of time 
in which District Courts had jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-3-4(8) (1997) ("Notwithstanding Subsection (1), between July 1, 1997, and 
July 1, 1998, the district court has subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors . . . 
only if: . . ."). This language was removed by the 1998 Legislature in House Bill 460, and 
subsequent versions of § 78-3-4(8) provided District Courts subject matter over class B 
misdemeanors subsequent to the fulfillment of certain conditions precedent without 
making any reference to a specific time period in which such jurisdiction could vest. See 
1998 Utah Laws 313 ( "Notwithstanding Subsection (1), between July 1, 1997, and July 
1, 1998, the district court has subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors . . . 
only i f : . . . " ) . This change evinces a recognition on the part of the Legislature that the 
subject matter jurisdiction of District Courts vis-a-vis § 78-3-4(8) could be cabined within 
specific allocations of time if the Legislature so intended (as was the case prior to the 
1998 statutory amendment in House Bill 460). However, the fact that the Legislature 
specifically chose to remove such time limitations on District Court subject matter 
jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors in its amendments to the Judicial Code in 1998 is 
evocative of an intent that such jurisdiction be limited only by the requirement that one or 
more of the conditions precedent outlined in § 78-3-4(8)(a)-(d) be fulfilled prior to such 
jurisdiction being invoked in District Court. 
The District Court's conclusion that the creation of the Salt Lake City Justice 
Court divested it of jurisdiction to adjudicate the present matter is without basis. The 
alternative conclusion - that jurisdiction vests at the time of filing and does not terminate 
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without some sort of Legislative action to the contrary - is supported by a plain language 
reading of the terms of the relevant statutes. 
Though not dispositive of the issue at hand, it bears noting that District Court 
adjudication of other matters filed in Third District Court pursuant to § 78-3-4(8) prior to 
the creation of the Salt Lake City Justice Court has continued routinely and without 
controversy from July 2002 to the present day. No statutory mechanism exists by which 
currently pending matters that were properly filed in District Court pursuant to § 78-3-
4(8) prior to July 2002 (for which the applicable statutes of limitation for -re-filing have 
now presumably lapsed) could be transferred or refilled in Salt Lake City Justice Court. 
Affirmation of the decision below would create an unjust and absurd unsettling of the 
expectations and routine practice of the appellant in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this court should reverse the trial court's final order of 
dismissal based on the finding that it lacked jurisdiction. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of April, 2009. 
SIMARJIT S. GILL 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
v / ^ I i ^ 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Constitution, article VIII, § 5. 
[Jurisdiction of district court and other courts ~ Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by 
this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district 
court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other 
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed 
originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the 
court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (2001) 
§ 78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not 
excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to 
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline consistent with the 
rules of the Supreme Court. 
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the circuit court 
prior to July 1, 1996. 
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de novo of the 
judgments of the justice court and of the small claims department of the district court. 
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district court are under 
Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review: 
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter, in 
its review of agency adjudicative proceedings; and 
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with Section 10-3-703.7. 
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject matter jurisdiction in 
class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances 
only if: 
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction; 
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996; 
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which the district 
courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed a justice court; or 
(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single criminal episode 
alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1997) 
§ 78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not 
excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to 
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline consistent with the 
rules of the Supreme Court. 
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the circuit court 
prior to July 1, 1996. 
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de novo of the 
judgments of the justice court and of the small claims department of the district court. 
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district court are under 
Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review agency adjudicative proceedings as set 
forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the 
requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), between July 1, 1997, and July 1, 1998, the district 
court has subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, 
infractions, and violations of ordinances only if: 
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction; 
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996; 
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which the district 
courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed a justice court; or 
(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single criminal episode 
alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-104 (2001) 
§ 78-5-104. Jurisdiction 
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of 
ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction, except those 
offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction. 
(2) Justice courts have jurisdiction of small claims cases under Title 78, Chapter 6, Small 
Claims Courts, if the defendant resides in or the debt arose within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the justice court. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
MS. HUNT: Good morning, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Start off with an interesting one. 
MS. HUNT: Yes. Would you please call the Weiner 
case--the Weiner case. Sorry, I've mispronounced it. 
THE COURT: All right. 
THE CLERK: What's the last name? 
MS. HUNT: Weiner. 
THE COURT: W-e-i-n--
MS. HUNT: It's No. 15 on the calendar. 
THE COURT: Okay. Where's your client? 
MS. HUNT: He's not here. He was excused. 
THE COURT: Okay. Are you ready to proceed? 
MS. HUNT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Go right ahead. 
MS. HUNT: Your Honor, I'd move to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction. At the time the case was filed, there was no 
justice court, but shortly after it was filed, one came into 
existence and I believe that under our statutory scheme, this 
Court no longer has jurisdiction over this Class B misdemeanor 
3 
1 1 case. 
2 THE COURT: Is jurisdiction a substantive or 
3 procedural right? 
4 MS. HUNT: I believe it's substantive. 
5 THE COURT: If it's substantive, then, doesn't the 
6 presumption against* retroactivity apply? 
7 MS. HUNT: I have no idea, I haven't researched 
8 that. 
9 I think Utah law, if you've had a chance to look at 
10 the memos--
11 THE COURT: I--I've--
12 MS. HUNT: You're right on top of all this, you're 
13 way ahead of me. I just think Utah law reflects that the 
14 legislative has the authority to create conditions that have 
15 jurisdiction. 
16 THE COURT: Clearly. There--there's no question 
17 about that, it certainly applies. 
18 MS. HUNT: Uh huh (affirmative) . 
19 THE COURT: But it seems to me the question that 
20 wasn't addressed in the memos is, one, okay, now we have the 
21 statute that applies, but like many other statutory changes, 
22 the question becomes whether the changes are retroactive and 
23 apply to pending--
24 MS. HUNT: Uh huh (affirmative). 
2 5 THE COURT: --cases or not. And the--
MS. HUNT: Uh huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: --the presumption is typically against 
retroactivity with exceptions being for amendments that are 
procedural versus substantive, but if a substantive right is--
is affected, then absent clear direction from the legislature, 
the statutory presumption (inaudible) statutes is it doesnft 
apply. 
MS. HUNT: I think Ifm going to have to research 
that and brief it for you, I don't know right off the top of 
my head. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ifm giving--I think I do, but I'm 
giving you a hard time about it. 
MS. HUNT: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Who's going to argue for the City? 
MS. WILLIAMSON: Your Honor, I don't know that I 
have--I--and I didn't address the retro--retroactivity 
question either, and I don't know that I have a lot to add to 
what I have written. And the Constitution says that the 
juris--basically the jurisdiction means (inaudible) prior to 
it--
THE COURT: Well, the Constitution--
MS. WILLIAMSON: --being met--
THE COURT: --kinda says something a little 
different from that, but doesn't--! mean, isn't that the 
5 
defendant's right--
MS. WILLIAMSON: Sure. 
THE COURT: --under the Sixth Amendment? It's not--
MS. WILLIAMSON: Sure. But it could go either way 
if we--
THE COURT: No. 
MS. WILLIAMSON: --were--I mean, if--if we don't 
look at it as being previously ascertained, then we could 
change it to a place more favorable or less favorable. 
THE COURT: Well, just help me out, though. The--
the Sixth Amendment provides a number of rights of the 
defendant, including the right to be represented by counsel; 
right? 
MS. WILLIAMSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: And a speedy public trial? 
MS. WILLIAMSON: Sure. 
THE COURT: And we let defendants waive those rights 
whenever they want. 
MS. WILLIAMSON: True. 
THE COURT: But in this position, where the 
defendant wants to waive this right, it is the City's position 
that he can't? 
MS. WILLIAMSON: Well, the City's position is that--
because there was simply no other place for this case to be 
filed, that it was properly filed here and it was not 
£ 
1 (inaudible) that court did not (inaudible) that--that crime; 
2 but that it didn't divest this Court of the jurisdiction 
3 except for cases that meant after that date. That specific 
4 condition. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MS. WILLIAMSON: And I couldn't find any--any case 
7 law, any rule that would affect (inaudible) 
8 THE COURT: The--the first question here is whether 
9 the statute, the jurisdictional statute applies at all, and 
10 both parties agree that it does, so that's not a question. 
11 The second is whether it applies retroactively. In-
12 -in fact, jurisdictional changes are viewed as taking away no 
13 substantive right, but simply changing the tribunal that's to 
14 hear the case and--and are largely construed as procedural. 
15 As a consequence, the presumption against retroactivity does 
16 not apply and it does apply retroactively. 
17 The--the only question then--or to pending cases, I 
18 should say. The only question is whether there was a 
19 Constitutional issue as raised by the City. It is odd that--
20 that--I mean, it is the defendant's right to waive the 
21 Constitutional argument. The defendant here has selected not 
22 to argue, that the Sixth--her Sixth Amendment rights have been 
23 violated and it's--you know, it's a little akin to the City 
24 arguing speedy trial. 
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THE COURT: --questions of--similar questions to 
those being raised by the Supreme Court and Congress' attempt 
to alter jurisdiction of the Federal Courts with respect to 
the Guantanamo Bay issue--individuals who--how they can affect 
jurisdiction of district courts in that, so it's a fascinating 
question. 
MS. HUNT: Thank you. 
THE COURT: The motion's granted, case is dismissed. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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